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On Investor Preferences and Mutual Fund Separation
Philip Dybvig Fang Liuy
July 2016
Abstract
We extend Cass and Stiglitzs analysis of preference-based mutual fund sepa-
ration. We provide a complete characterization of the generalK-fund separation.
We show that some instances of high-degree separation can be constructed by
adding inverse marginal utility functions exhibiting lower degrees of separation.
We also show that there is money separation (in which we can choose the riskless
asset as one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may or may not
be the riskless asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes. In general,
we do not know how to write the separating utility functions in closed form, but
we can do so in the special case of SAHARA utility dened by Chen et al. and
for a new class of GOBI preferences introduced here.
1 Introduction
Mutual fund separation is an important concept in portfolio selection. It means that
all investorsoptimal portfolio choices can be constructed as the linear combination
of a set of mutual funds regardless of the initial wealth level, where a mutual fund
can be any portfolio of tradable assets in the market. In other words, under mutual
fund separation investors should be able to achieve the same level of utility from
the individual assets as if they were only o¤ered a set of mutual funds. The term
separation comes from the fact that every investor can separate his portfolio
choice into two steps. First, the investor chooses a small set of funds that spans
optimal portfolios of all wealth levels. Second, the investor determines the optimal
mixture of the separating funds based on his current wealth level.
The rst results of mutual fund separation are developed under the mean-variance
framework. Tobin (1958) nds that when investors only care about the mean and
variance of the return distribution and in the presence of a riskless asset, optimal con-
sumptions can be spanned by a risky portfolio and the riskless asset. He also shows
Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis. E-mail: dybvig@wustl.edu.
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that the mean-variance assumption is consistent with von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences with quadratic utility functions. Black (1972) proves that under mean-
variance preferences, even in the absence of the riskless asset, similar two-fund sepa-
ration results still hold with both separating funds being risky portfolios.
When agents do not have mean-variance preferences, some alternative assumption
is needed to support mutual fund separation. Such conditions can be roughly classi-
ed into two types: those in terms of investor preferences and those in terms of the
distributions of asset returns. Among research examining preference-based separa-
tion, Pye (1967) and Hakansson (1969) nd that the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA) class exhibits two-fund separation with one of the separating funds being
the riskless asset. Cass and Stiglitz (1970) further characterize the class of preferences
that permits mutual fund separation, regardless of the distributions of asset returns.
On the return distribution side, e¤orts have been made to delineate the class of sto-
chastic processes that supports separation for all utility functions. Samuelson (1967)
shows that if asset payo¤s are independent and identically distributed, all risk-averse
agents will choose the equally-weighted portfolio, and more generally Ross (1978)
derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the stochastic structure of asset re-
turns such that mutual fund separation can be sustained, independent of investor
preferences.
In this paper, we extend Cass and Stiglitzs analysis of preference-based mu-
tual fund separation. While Cass and Stiglitz mostly focus on one- and two-fund
separation, we emphasize the general K-fund separation.1 We provide a complete
characterization of the general K-fund separation in terms of the inverse marginal
utility function. We show that high-degree separation can be constructed by adding
low-degree separating preferences in the inverse marginal utility function. However,
this method does not allow us to nd all utility functions satisfying fund separation.
We also study money separation in which we can choose the riskless asset as one of
the separating funds. We show that money separation holds if and only if there is a
fund (the riskless asset or a risky portfolio) whose optimal allocation is constant and
does not depend on initial wealth. While it is generally hard, if not impossible, to
1Cass and Stiglitz (1970) do have a result on high-degree separation, their confusing Theorem 7.1,
which is presented without proof. Unfortunately, this is a weak point in a great paper, and seems
to be incorrect if only because the trigonometric terms are missing. Given the Remark after the
statement of the theorem and the discussion in footnote 1 in Appendix II, it seems to be assumed
that the trigonometric terms are ruled out in general by concavity, like they are for one- and two-fund
separation.
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write the utility function of a separating preference in closed form, we show that this
can be achieved for two special classes of preferences, both of which exhibit three-fund
separation. We also make a minor contribution to the theory of one- and two-fund
separation. Mirror CRRA preferences have a functional form like constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, but are dened on negative wealth. We also con-
sider two-fund separating preferences constructed from mirror CRRA preferences,
perhaps in combination with CRRA preferences.
The study of mutual fund separation has important implications. If we have
reasons to believe thatK-fund separation holds, whereK is a relatively small number,
then a money manager could set up a relatively small set of commingled portfolios,
active or passive according to the managers style, to serve all clients at all levels
of wealth. The optimal combination of these commingled portfolios would deliver
the same payo¤ and therefore the same level of utility as individualized portfolios
constructed optimally from the individual assets for each client. In other words, we
could set up the K separating funds as index funds in a fund family, and these funds
are all that an investor would ever need to trade.
It is also useful to study mutual fund separation because it helps to motivate new
tractable functional forms of utility functions. In many important nance problems
such as portfolio selection and asset pricing, fund separation often simplies the
analysis. While most existing work focuses on one- and two-fund separation, we
show that higher degrees of separation are rich and interesting but still tractable.
We consider a one-period setting: investors with von Neumann-Morgenstern pref-
erences invest at the beginning of the period and consume at the end. Given complete
markets with a unique stochastic discount factor, the optimal consumption portfolio
is determined by the rst order condition, which says that the marginal utility at
optimum is proportional to the stochastic discount factor. Strict concavity then en-
ables us to invert the marginal utility function and express the optimal portfolio as
the inverse marginal utility evaluated at the stochastic discount factor multiplied by
the shadow price which depends on the initial wealth level. This approach allows us
to prove a general characterization of preference-based K-fund separation in terms
of the inverse marginal utility, which includes K-fund separating preferences that
can be generated by combining one-fund separating preferences, as well as some that
cannot. Various examples allow us to explore how this works.
Following Cass and Stiglitz (1970), we say there is money separation if there is
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separation and one of the funds can be chosen to be the riskless asset. We show that
money separation holds if and only if we can choose a separating fund whose optimal
investment weight is constant and independent of the initial wealth level. Interest-
ingly, the constant weight can be assigned to either the riskless asset (e.g., quadratic
utility) or a risky fund (e.g., constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility). In
addition, we also show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility
function. A non-money separating utility function can be converted into a money
separating utility function by adding a constant to the inverse marginal utility, or
equivalently through a translation of consumption, as when we go from CRRA utility
to HARA utility with the same exponent.
The characterization of separating utility functions gives the inverse marginal util-
ity in closed form. From this, we can derive the utility function itself by rst inverting
the inverse marginal utility to obtain the marginal utility, and then integrating the
marginal utility to obtain the utility function. This is easy numerically, but unfor-
tunately does not yield a closed-form expression except in a few special cases. Aside
from the one- and two-fund separating cases already in the literature, we discuss two
cases with closed-form expressions for the utility function. One is the symmetric as-
ymptotic hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (SAHARA) preferences proposed by Chen,
Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011), and another is the GOBI preferences to be introduced
in this paper. Both classes exhibit three-fund separation, and they have not only a
simple form in the inverse marginal utility, but a closed-form expression in the utility
function itself.
Concavity imposes additional constraints on our characterization of separation.
A separating utility function is strictly concave if and only if the inverse marginal
utility is monotonically decreasing everywhere.2 It is hard to derive necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for strict concavity in terms of the parameter values, something
similar to nding conditions for a polynomial to be positive everywhere. Nonetheless,
we analyze specic examples and we give su¢ cient conditions to be inconsistent with
any strictly concave utility function.
Finally, we extend our analyses from the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility to a broader set of Machina preferences. According to Machina (1982), when
the utility function is smooth enough, these preferences can be locally modeled as
2This is not true for all potential utility functions, for example one with a kink, but separating
utility functions are in a restricted class.
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expected utility. We show that if the local utility function satises fund separation
everywhere with the same set of separating funds, this is su¢ cient but not necessary
for global fund separation. We illustrate this using examples.
In this paper, we follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and consider complete markets
only. In general, separation need not hold under conditions of the theorems when
markets are incomplete, with some known exceptions in the literature. Hakansson
(1969) shows that one-fund separation still holds for logarithm and power utility even
if markets are incomplete, and in the presence of a riskless asset, the HARA class
exhibits two-fund separation even if markets are incomplete. Black (1972) shows that
quadratic utility satises two-fund separation under incomplete markets even without
a riskless asset. Beyond this short list of known examples, the su¢ cient conditions
provided in this paper are no longer su¢ cient if markets are incomplete, and we
can construct numerical examples where two-fund separation fails when markets are
incomplete.3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 denes mutual fund sepa-
ration and characterizes the class of separating preferences in terms of the inverse
marginal utility function. We also demonstrate how low-degree separation can be
used to construct high-degree separating preferences. Section 3 studies money sepa-
ration. Section 4 derives the utility functions for the SAHARA and GOBI preferences,
both of which exhibit three-fund separation. Section 5 examines conditions for strict
concavity and discusses how they can be used to rene the separating class. Section
6 discusses su¢ cient conditions for fund separation for Machina preferences. Section
7 concludes the paper. Some intuitive proofs are included in the main text, while
other proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Mutual Fund Separation
In this section, we study necessary and su¢ cient conditions for preference-based K-
fund separation.
2.1 Setup
Following Cass and Stiglitz (1970), we consider a one-period model, in which investors
invest at the beginning of the period and consume at the end. Assume that markets
3As in Dybvig and Ross (1982), the minimal example has three assets and four states, for similar
reasons.
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are complete and there exists a unique stochastic discount factor  > 0 that takes
all positive values with E () < 1. We also use  to represent realizations of the
random stochastic discount factor. Assume that each investor has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u () dened on any open interval D  R, which is
twice di¤erentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0: We allow for both positive and negative
consumption levels.4 We denote the set of utility functions of all investors by U .
Then, an investor with utility function u 2 U and initial wealth w0 2 R solves the
following utility maximization problem.
Problem 1 Choose consumption x to
max
x
E [u (x)]
subject to the budget constraint
E (x)  w0:
We denote the set of solutions to Problem 1 by S (u;w0) : By strict concavity of
u; S (u;w0) is either an empty set or a singleton. Assume that for all utility functions
under consideration, there exists an open interval for the initial wealth such that an
optimum to Problem 1 exists, i.e., S (u;w0) 6= ?: Now we dene K-fund separation
if there are no fewer than K mutual funds whose random payo¤s span the optimal
consumptions of all investors whenever an optimum exists, regardless of the initial
wealth level.
Denition 1 We have K-fund separation if K is the smallest positive integer such
that there exist K mutual funds ffk ()gk=1;:::;K , which satisfy that for all u 2 U
and w0 2 R, if S (u;w0) 6= ?; then we can nd fk (u;w0)gk=1;:::;K such that
KX
k=1
k (u;w0) fk () 2 S (u;w0).
Several comments are worth pointing out. First, the optimal consumptions and
the separating funds are both identied in terms of payo¤, whereas the associated
portfolio compositions may not be uniquely determined in the presence of redundant
assets. Second, whenever K-fund separation holds for K  2, the set of separat-
ing funds is not unique. Indeed, having one set of separating funds, we can easily
4While negative consumption may seem absurd on its face, what we call consumption might be
the net trade or it can be justied by a promise to do work to cover any negative amount. Also,
even if consumption is not literally negative, it can be a useful modelling device.
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construct another by taking linear combinations of the original set of funds, and the
resulting investment weights are also linear combinations of the original weights. Fi-
nally, while K-fund separation is dened for a set of utility functions, we are often
interested in K-fund separation for a single utility function as a special case, which
is obtained when U contains one utility function only.
One special form of mutual fund separation obtains when we can choose the
riskless asset as one of the separating funds. We follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and
refer to this special case as money separation. In other words, money separation holds
as long as the riskless asset is in the linear span of the separating funds. Formally,
we have the following denition.
Denition 2 We have K-fund money separation if K-fund separation holds and we
can choose f1 () = 1:5
To characterize utility functions exhibiting mutual fund separation, we solve Prob-
lem 1. Suppose a solution exists, then the rst order condition implies that the
optimal consumption portfolio is given by
x = I () ; (1)
where I = (u0) 1 is the inverse marginal utility function, and  > 0 is the shadow price
whose value depends on the initial wealth level w0. Since u00 < 0; it is apparent that I
exists and is unique. Preferences are unchanged by an increasing a¢ ne transformation
of the utility function u or equivalently by the rescaling of the argument of the inverse
marginal utility function I:We will not distinguish di¤erent utility functions or inverse
marginal utility functions that represent the same preferences.
If the utility function u satisesK-fund separation, then the optimal consumption
(1) can be written as the weighted sum ofK mutual funds, with the associated weights
depending on the initial wealth w0 and thus on the shadow price ; i.e.,
I () =
KX
k=1
k () fk () : (2)
Notice that to ensure non-degeneracy, we must have that the separating funds fk ()
are linearly independent, and that the associated investment weights k () are also
5The payo¤ to the riskless asset can take any constant value. Without loss of generality, we
normalize it to be equal to 1.
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linearly independent. Otherwise, the degree of separation can always be reduced
by combining two or more funds to form a larger separating fund. In addition, for
tractability, we only consider cases in which k () are analytic functions.6
2.2 Some Examples
Before we formally characterize the set of separating preferences, let us rst look at
a few examples. Some of the following examples involve very well-known preferences,
while others are less so. One might wonder how we come up with the more obscure
examples. In fact, these examples are motivated by the general characterization of
separating preferences to be introduced in the next section.
Example 1 (CRRA utility) Consider the CRRA utility function
u (x) =
(
x1 R
1 R ; R > 0 and R 6= 1
log x; R = 1
dened on all x 2 (0;+1) ; where R is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The
inverse marginal utility function is given by
I () =  
1
R :
Since
I () = () 
1
R =  
1
R  
1
R ;
we know from (2) that the CRRA utility function exhibits one-fund separation with
separating fund
f () =  
1
R ;
and corresponding investment weight
 () =  
1
R :
Hence, an investor with CRRA utility would always nd it optimal to invest his entire
wealth into a single mutual fund  
1
R ; regardless of the initial wealth level.
Example 2 (Quadratic utility) Consider the quadratic utility function
u (x) =  x2 + 2bx;
6A function f () is said to be analytic if for any x0 in the interior of its domain, the Taylor series
of f around x0 converges to f (x0) on an interval of positive radius centered at x0:
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where x < b: The inverse marginal utility function is given by
I () = b  1
2
:
Since
I () = b  1
2
;
the quadratic utility function exhibits two-fund money separation with separating
funds
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = ;
and corresponding investment weights
1 () = b;
2 () =  1
2
:
Hence, an investor with quadratic utility would optimally invest a xed amount b into
the riskless asset and take a wealth-dependent short position in the risky portfolio .
Example 3 (SAHARA utility) The SAHARA preferences are introduced in Chen,
Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011). They show that for a SAHARA utility function with
scale parameter b > 0 and risk aversion parameter a > 0; the inverse marginal utility
is given by
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

:
Since
I () =
1
2

() 
1
a   b2 () 1a

=
1
2
 
1
a  
1
a   1
2
b2
1
a 
1
a ;
the SAHARA utility function exhibits two-fund separation with separating funds
f1 () = 
  1
a ;
f2 () = 
1
a ;
and corresponding investment weights
1 () =
1
2
 
1
a ;
2 () =  1
2
b2
1
a :
Hence, an investor with SAHARA utility would always nd it optimal to take a long
position in fund  
1
a and a short position in fund 
1
a .
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A common feature of the above three examples is that their inverse marginal
utility functions can all be viewed as linear combinations of power terms  : In the
CRRA case, there is only one power term  
1
R ; in the quadratic case, there are two
power terms 1 and  corresponding to  = 0; 1; in the SAHARA case, there are again
two power terms 
1
a and  
1
a : While one may suspect that the power terms are the
only functional form permitted by separability, the following example demonstrates
that the logarithm term log  can also show up.
Example 4 (CARA utility) Consider the CARA utility function
u (x) =  e Ax;
with the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion A > 0: The inverse marginal utility
function is given by
I () =
1
A
(logA  log ) :
Since
I () =
1
A
(logA  log ()) = 1
A
(logA  log )  1
A
log ;
the CARA utility function exhibits two-fund money separation with separating funds
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = log ;
and corresponding investment weights
1 () =
1
A
(logA  log ) ;
2 () =   1
A
:
Hence, an investor with CARA utility would always nd it optimal to invest a wealth-
dependent amount into the riskless asset and take a constant short position in the risky
portfolio log .
In all four examples above, whenever a power term  shows up in the inverse
marginal utility function,  always takes real values. However, this does not have to
be the case. When we have a pair of complex power values  bi, bi can be trans-
formed into cos (b log )  and sin (b log )  : The following example demonstrates
that these terms can also appear in a separating preference.
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Example 5 Consider a utility function u, whose inverse marginal utility is given by
I () = [cos (log ) + sin (log ) + 2]  2:
It can be veried that I 0 () < 0 (corresponding to concavity of utility) and
I () = [cos (log ()) + sin (log ()) + 2] () 2
= [cos (log ) + sin (log )] 2 cos (log )  2
+ [cos (log )  sin (log )] 2 sin (log )  2 + 2 2 2:
Hence, we have three-fund separation with separating funds
f1 () = cos (log ) 
 2;
f2 () = sin (log ) 
 2;
f3 () = 
 2;
and corresponding investment weights
1 () = [cos (log ) + sin (log )]
 2;
2 () = [cos (log )  sin (log )] 2;
3 () = 2
 2:
2.3 General Characterization of K-Fund Separation
In this section, we provide a general characterization of preference-basedK-fund sepa-
ration. Our characterization is stated in terms of the inverse marginal utility function
I:We show that the inverse marginal utility of a separating preference can only have
the following terms: C (constant),  , (log )l,  (log )l, cos (b log ), sin (b log ),
 cos (b log ),  sin (b log ), (log )l cos (b log ), (log )l sin (b log ),  (log )l cos (b log ),
and  (log )l sin (b log ) : Indeed, we have already seen many of these terms in the
examples above.
The following theorem provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for K-fund
separation, where K  1 can be any positive integer. This characterization is similar
to Theorem 7.1 in Cass and Stiglitz (1970), although their result is stated without
proof and seems to be incorrect if only because the trigonometric terms are missing.
Their result also seems to contain terms that should not be there. However, the
remark to the theorem describes an additional restriction which rules out at least
some of the extra terms.
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Theorem 1 A utility function u (with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0) exhibits K-fund separation
if and only if the inverse marginal utility function I = (u0) 1 can be expressed as
I () =
JX
k=1
kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) +
JX
k=1
kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) ; (3)
where
(1) The ordered pairs (k; bk) are distinct for each k with bk  0;
(2) For i = 1; 2; Pk;i (log ) is a polynomial function of log  of degree dk;i  0,
i.e. Pk;i (log ) =
Pdk;i
j=0Ck;i;j (log )
j ; where the leading coe¢ cient Ck;i;dk;i 6= 0;
(3) If bk = 0 (the sin terms disappear, but the cos terms do not), then dk;2 = 0;
and
(4)
JX
k=1
(dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) = K; where dk = maxi=1;2 (dk;i) ; and 1bk 6=0 is an
indicator function that takes a value of 1 when bk 6= 0 and 0 otherwise.
The separating funds can be chosen as follows: 8k = 1; 2;    ; J and 8l = 0; 1;    ; dk;
fk;l () = 
k (log )l ; (4)
when bk = 0; and
f
k;1;l
() = k cos (bk log ) (log )
l ; (5)
f
k;2;l
() = k sin (bk log ) (log )
l ; (6)
when bk 6= 0:
The associated investment weights are given by
k;l () = 
k
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ; (7)
when bk = 0; and

k;1;l
() = 1ldk;1
k cos (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l (8)
+1ldk;2
k sin (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l ;

k;2;l
() = 1ldk;2
k cos (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l (9)
 1ldk;1k sin (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ;
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when bk 6= 0:
Proof of Theorem 1 (sketch): Here is a sketch of the proof, which focuses on the
necessity of (3). The complete formal proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Since the utility function u exhibits K-fund separation, we must have that (2)
holds whenever a solution to Problem 1 exists. Taking derivatives of (2) with respect
to  yields 0B@ I
(1) ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA = M0 ()
0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA ;
where I(k) () denotes the kth derivative of I () ; and M0 () is dened as
M0 () =
0B@ 
(1)
1 ()    (1)K ()
...
. . .
...

(K)
1 ()    (K)K ()
1CA : (10)
Assume for now thatM0 () is non-singular for some ; i.e., 9 such that (M0 ()) 1
exists. We show in the appendix that a simple trick allows us to tackle the singularity
case for which similar results obtain. When M0 () is not singular, we have0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA = (M0 ()) 1
0B@ I
(1) ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA : (11)
Plugging (11) back into (2) gives
I () =
0B@ 1 ()...
K ()
1CA
T
(M0 ())
 1
0B@ I
(1) ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA : (12)
Without loss of generality, assume that (M0 ())
 1 exists when  = 1: Evaluating
(12) at  = 1 and rearranging yield a di¤erential equation of the form
AKI
(K) () K +   +A1I(1) ()  + I () = 0; (13)
where A1; A2;    ; AK are constants. To ensure non-degenerate K-fund separation,
we must have AK 6= 0. Then, (13) is a Kth-order homogeneous Euler di¤erential
equation.
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To solve this di¤erential equation, we conjecture I () =  and plug this into
(13). This gives us the following Kth-order polynomial equation
AK (   1)    (  K + 1) +   +A2 (   1) +A1 + 1 = 0; (14)
with K roots. Some of these K roots may be repeated, thus reducing to J  K
distinct roots fk + bkigJk=1, each of which can be either real (bk = 0) or complex
(bk 6= 0). If a real root k is repeated for dk + 1 times (dk = 0 means that the root
is not repeated), it gives rise to dk + 1 terms
n
k (log )l
odk
l=0
in I () ; which can be
combined as kPk;1 (log ) : If a pair of complex roots k  bki is repeated for dk + 1
times, it then generates kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) and kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) in
I () : To ensure that the total number of roots is equal to K; we must have
K =
JX
k=1
(dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) :
Combining all the above terms, we have that I () takes the form of (3).
While (3) seems complicated, it is indeed a concise way to incorporate all possible
terms in I listed at the beginning of the section. The following table summarizes
di¤erent possible terms in I and the corresponding parameter values.
Possible terms in I k bk l
C (constant) 0 0 0
  0 0
(log )l 0 0  0
 (log )l  0  0
cos (b log ) ; sin (b log ) 0 b 0
 cos (b log ) ;  sin (b log )  b 0
(log )l cos (b log ) ; (log )l sin (b log ) 0 b  0
 (log )l cos (b log ) ;  (log )l sin (b log )  b  0
The characterization of K-fund separation for a class of preferences U follows
almost immediately from Theorem 1. The inverse marginal utility of each u 2 U
must be the sum of terms as in (3), and the leading coe¢ cient on each of these terms
must be non-zero for some utility function u^ 2 U to ensure non-degeneracy. Formally,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 A class of preferences U exhibits K-fund separation if and only if there
exist J distinct ordered pairs f(k; bk)gJk=1 with bk  0 and non-negative integers
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fDkgJk=1 that satisfy
JX
k=1
(Dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) = K such that 8u 2 U , the inverse
marginal utility function I = (u0) 1 can be expressed as (3), where
(1) For i = 1; 2; Pk;i (log ()) is a polynomial function of log () of degree dk;i 
 1: When dk;i =  1; Pk;i (log ()) is an empty sum, which we take to be uniformly
equal to zero;
(2) If bk = 0 (the sin terms disappear, but the cos terms do not), then dk;2 =  1;
(3) 8k = 1; 2;    ; J; maxi=1;2 dk;i  Dk;
(4) 8k = 1; 2;    ; J; 9u^ 2 U such that maxi=1;2 d^k;i = Dk:
Mutual fund separation for a class of preferences is very similar to that for a single
utility function. Hence, we focus on fund separation for a single utility function in
the analyses below.
2.4 From Low-Degree to High-Degree Separation
Theorem 1 provides a simple way of constructing higher-degree separating preferences
from those with lower degrees. We now state it below.
Theorem 2 Consider N utility functions fungNn=1 with corresponding inverse mar-
ginal utility given by fIngNn=1 : Suppose that each un exhibits Kn-fund separation.
Dene another utility function u; whose inverse marginal utility is given by
I () =
NX
n=1
tnIn () ; (15)
for some non-zero constants t1; t2;    ; tN : Then, u satises K-fund separation with
K 
NX
n=1
Kn;
where the equality holds if the separating funds of all un are linearly independent.
Proof of Theorem 2: For each n; since un exhibits Kn-fund separation, there must
exist ffn;k ()gk and fn;k ()gk such that
In () =
KnX
k=1
n;k () fn;k () :
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By (15), we thus have
I () =
NX
n=1
tnIn () =
NX
n=1
KnX
k=1
tnn;k () fn;k () :
This implies that u satises fund separation.
If all ffn;k ()gn;k are linearly independent, then Theorem 1 implies that all
fn;k ()gn;k are also linearly independent. Hence, ffn;k ()gn;k serve as a set of sep-
arating funds for u with the associated investment weights given by ftnn;k ()gn;k ;
and the degree of separation is K =
PN
n=1Kn: If ffn;k ()gn;k are linearly dependent,
then multiple funds can be combined, which reduces the degree of separation, i.e.,
K <
PN
n=1Kn:
Theorem 2 implies that one can generate high-degree separating preferences by
taking linear combinations of lower-degree ones in the inverse marginal utility func-
tion. One would wonder if this allows us to nd the entire set of separating utility
based on one-fund separation only. Unfortunately, this is not true, due to the ex-
istence of repeated and complex roots of (14), which correspond to logarithm and
trigonometric terms in the characterization (3). To illustrate this, it is useful to
review one- and two-fund separation here.
2.4.1 One-Fund Separation
It is immediate from Theorem (1) that a utility function u exhibits one-fund sepa-
ration if and only (14) has a single real root ; in which case the inverse marginal
utility can be written as
I () = C 1=R; (16)
for some constant C and R =  1=: Note that changing the sign of C changes
preferences, while changing the magnitude without changing the sign only changes
the scaling of the utility function and does not change preferences. Conditions for
strict concavity are at least implicit in the literature (except perhaps for the mirror
CRRA case discussed below), but we repeat them for completeness. Strict concavity
requires I 0 () =  CR 1 1=R < 0; i.e.,
C
R
> 0:
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One can verify that the utility function for the one-fund separating preferences is
u (x) =
(
C
1 R
 
x
C
1 R
; R 6= 0 or 1
C log
 
x
C

; R = 1
; (17)
where the domain of consumption is x 2 (0;+1) when R > 0 and the domain is
x 2 ( 1; 0) when R < 0: Notice that when R > 0 and C > 0, this corresponds
to the CRRA utility function, which is dened on positive consumption levels, as in
Example 1. When R < 0 and C < 0, we refer to this utility function as mirror CRRA
preferences, since it has the same form as CRRA but is dened on negative wealth.
2.4.2 Two-Fund Separation
If a utility function u exhibits two-fund separation, then Theorem (1) implies that
there are potentially four di¤erent types of cases, only three of which are consistent
with concavity, and only one of which can be constructed by combining one-fund
separating preferences.
Case 1: When (14) has two non-zero distinct real roots, 1 and 2, (3) is equivalent
to
I () = C1
 1=R1 + C2 1=R2 ; (18)
where R1 =  1=1 6= R2 =  1=2; and C1 and C2 are arbitrary constants such that
C1=R1 > 0 and C2=R2 > 0 for concavity. An example of this case is the SAHARA
utility function obtained when R1 = a and R2 =  a (Example 3). For all preferences
characterized by (18), the two-fund separating utility function can be obtained as in
Theorem 2 from the one-fund separating utility functions with relative risk aversion
R1 and R2.
Case 2: When (14) has two distinct real roots, 0 and , (3) is equivalent to
I () = C1 + C2
 1=R; (19)
where R =  1=; and C1 and C2 are arbitrary constants such that C1 6= 0 and
C2=R > 0. This can be viewed as the limit of Case 1 when one of the risk aversion
levels goes to innity. An example of this is quadratic utility (Example 2), obtained
by adding a constant to a mirror CRRA preference in the inverse marginal utility.
All utility functions of this form are in the HARA class and have money separation
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(see Section 3). These preferences cannot be derived by combining preferences with
one-fund separation, except as a limiting case.
Case 3: When (14) has two repeated real roots, (3) is equivalent to
I () = C1
 + C2
 log ;
for some constants C1 and C2: Strict concavity implies  = 0 (see Proposition 2 of
Section 5), so we must have
I () = C1 + C2 log ;
which is CARA utility u (x) =  e Ax with A =  1=C2 > 0 (see Example 4). This
case cannot be derived by combining preferences with one-fund separation, because
the logarithm term never shows up in one-fund separation.
Case 4: When (14) has a pair of complex roots, (3) is equivalent to
I () = C1
 cos (b log ) + C2
 sin (b log ) ;
with constants b 6= 0; C1 and C2:We will show in Proposition 2 of Section 5 that this
form cannot exist under strict concavity.
While the trigonometric terms cannot appear in one- or two-fund separation, they
can appear in higher-degree separation, as in Example 5.
3 Money Separation
Money separation is a special case of mutual fund separation, which obtains when
we can choose the riskless asset as one of the separating funds. Examples of money
separation we have encountered so far include quadratic (Example 2) and CARA (Ex-
ample 4) preferences. In this section, we discuss money separation and its properties
in greater depth.
3.1 Money Separation and Constant Investment Weight
An interesting observation is that for the quadratic and CARA preferences, both
of which exhibit money separation, the optimal investment strategy always involves
assigning a constant weight (dollar amount) to one of the separating funds, regardless
of the initial wealth level. In particular, for the quadratic case, the constant weight is
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assigned to the riskless asset, whereas a CARA investor optimally assigns a constant
weight to a risky fund. A natural question is whether this is merely a coincidence or
it actually reveals a property of money separation. The following theorem answers
this question.
Theorem 3 A separating utility function exhibits money separation if and only if
the optimal investment portfolio can be constructed by assigning a constant amount
to one separating fund, regardless of the initial wealth.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is our task to show that having the riskless asset in the
span of the separating funds is equivalent to being able to choose a separating fund
with a constant investment. We will show that both are equivalent to having a root
of equation (14) with (k; bk) = (0; 0) :
By Theorem 1, if a utility function u exhibits mutual fund separation, then the
separating funds can be chosen as
fk;l () = 
k (log )l (20)
when bk = 0, or
f
k;1;l
() = k cos (bk log ) (log )
l ; (21)
f
k;2;l
() = k sin (bk log ) (log )
l : (22)
when bk 6= 0 for all (k; l) : Therefore, u satises money separation if and only if (20),
(21), (22), or any of their linear combinations equals a constant. Since any nite
set of terms for di¤erent (k; l) is linearly independent, money separation holds if and
only if (20) is a constant for some (k; l), which happens if and only if (k; bk) = (0; 0)
with l = 0:
For a separating preference, the investment weights associated with separating
funds (20), (21) and (22) are given by
k;l () = 
k
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l (23)
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when bk = 0; and

k;1;l
() = 1ldk;1
k cos (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l (24)
+1ldk;2
k sin (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l ;

k;2;l
() = 1ldk;2
k cos (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l (25)
 1ldk;1k sin (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l
when bk 6= 0: Therefore, one separating fund receives a constant weight if and only if
(23), (24), (25) or any of their linear combinations equals a constant. Since any nite
set of terms for di¤erent (k; l) is linearly independent, a constant weight obtains if and
only if (23) is a constant for some (k; l), which happens if and only if (k; bk) = (0; 0)
with l = dk;1:
Hence, the theorem is proven.
According to Theorem 3, for a money separating preference, the optimal invest-
ment strategy can be constructed by assigning a constant amount to one of the
separating funds. Interestingly, the fund with the constant weight can be either the
riskless asset or a risky fund. As shown in the above proof, the riskless asset cor-
responds to (k; bk) = (0; 0) and l = 0; whereas the constant investment weight is
assigned to the separating fund with (k; bk) = (0; 0) and l = dk;1: Therefore, the
riskless asset receives a constant weight if and only if (k; bk) = (0; 0) and dk;1 = 0;
i.e., (14) has a non-repeated zero root, as in the case of quadratic utility. When the
zero root is repeated, as for CARA utility, then the riskless asset receives a wealth-
dependent investment weight, and the constant weight is assigned to a risky fund.
3.2 Money Separation and Shifts in Utility
In this section, we show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility
function. Indeed, we can construct money separating preferences from non-money
separation by introducing a shift in the utility function. This is formalized in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 4 Suppose that a utility function u exhibits K-fund non-money separation.
Dene u^ (x) = u (x  C0) for an arbitrary constant C0 6= 0: Then, u^ satises (K + 1)-
fund money separation.
Proof of Theorem 4: Since
u^ (x) = u (x  C0) ;
one can verify that the associated inverse marginal utility satises
I^ () = I () + C0: (26)
Thus, introducing a shift to the utility function is equivalent to adding a constant
term in the inverse marginal utility.
If u exhibits K-fund non-money separation, then there exist k () and fk () for
k = 1; 2;    ;K such that
I () =
KX
k=1
k () fk () ; (27)
where none of fk () or any of their linear combination equals a constant, and none
of k () or any of their linear combination equals a constant.
From (26) and (27), we have
I^ () = I () + C0 =
KX
k=1
k () fk () + C0:
Hence, u^ exhibits (K + 1)-fund money separation with the K + 1 separating funds
given by ffk ()gk and 1, and the associated investment weights given by fk ()gk
and C0.
To demonstrate how Theorem 4 works, it is useful to consider the one-fund sep-
arating preferences
u (x) =
(
C
1 R
 
x
C
1 R
; R 6= 0 or 1
C log
 
x
C

; R = 1
;
whose inverse marginal utility function is given by
I () = C 1=R:
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By introducing a shift to the utility function, we obtain the HARA class
u^ (x) =
(
C
1 R
 
x C0
C
1 R
; R 6= 0 or 1
C log
 
x C0
C

; R = 1
;
with inverse marginal utility function
I^ () = C 1=R + C0:
We have seen in Section 2.4.2 that these preferences satisfy two-fund money sepa-
ration when C0 6= 0. Hence, we obtain two-fund money separating preferences by
introducing a non-zero shift to the one-fund separating utility function.
It is worth mentioning that money separation obtained this way always assigns
a constant weight to the riskless asset. As discussed in Section 3.1, this is only one
of the two possible cases of money separation. The other case in which the constant
weight is assigned to a risky fund cannot be obtained using this approach.
4 Closed-Form Utility Functions
We have characterized the set of separating preferences in terms of the inverse mar-
ginal utility function. We then ask whether we are able to derive the associated
utility function. A natural way to do this is by rst inverting I to obtain u0; and then
integrating u0 to obtain u: Unfortunately, however, this does not yield a closed-form
expression except in a few special cases, with those already in the literature limited
to one- and two-fund separation (e.g., CRRA, CARA and quadratic utility, etc.).
In this section, we discuss two classes of three-fund money separating preferences,
SAHARA and GOBI utility, for which closed-form expressions of the utility function
exist.
4.1 SAHARA Utility
The SAHARA preferences are proposed by Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011). The
standard SAHARA utility is dened on the entire real line R and has an inverse
marginal utility function of the form
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

; (28)
with a; b > 0: As shown in Example 3, these preferences exhibit two-fund non-money
separation.
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More generally, we allow for a shift in the SAHARA utility function, which is
equivalent to adding a constant term to the inverse marginal utility, i.e.,
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

+ C0: (29)
The constant C0 is referred to as the default point in Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop
(2011), and the standard form obtains by setting C0 = 0: We know from Theorem 4
that when C0 6= 0; the shifted SAHARA utility exhibits three-fund money separation.
The separating funds can be chosen as
f1 () = 
  1
a ;
f2 () = 
1
a ;
f3 () = 1;
with the corresponding investment weights given by
1 () =
1
2
 
1
a ;
2 () =  1
2
b2
1
a ;
3 () = C0:
One nice property of the SAHARA utility is that the two power terms in the
inverse marginal utility,  
1
a and 
1
a ; are reciprocals of each other. We can thus
rewrite (29) as a quadratic equation of 
1
a , which further allows us to invert I to
recover the underlying utility function. Specically, multiplying 
1
a on both sides of
(29) and setting I () = x and  = u0 (x) yield
b2
 
u0 (x)
 2
a + 2 (x  C0)
 
u0 (x)
 1
a   1 = 0; (30)
which can be viewed as a quadratic equation of (u0 (x))
1
a : Since u0 (x) > 0; we focus
on positive solutions to (30). Using the properties of quadratic equations, we can
verify that (30) has a unique positive solution given by
u0 (x) =
0@
q
(G (x))2 + b2  G (x)
b2
1Aa ;
where G (x) = x  C0: Integrating u0 (x) then gives us the utility function
u (x) =
8>><>>:
1
1 a2
q
(G (x))2 + b2 +G (x)
 a
a
q
(G (x))2 + b2 +G (x)

; a 6= 1
1
2 log
q
(G (x))2 + b2 +G (x)

+ G(x)
2b2
q
(G (x))2 + b2  G (x)

; a = 1
:
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4.2 GOBI Utility
Dene the class of GOBI preferences, whose inverse marginal utility function takes
the form
I () = C1
 + C2
2 + C0; (31)
where ;C1 and C2 are non-zero constants such that C1 < 0 and C2 < 0 for
concavity. As for the SAHARA class, we include a constant C0 in the inverse marginal
utility to capture potential shifts in the utility function. As opposed to the SAHARA
utility, which is dened on the entire real line, the GOBI utility is dened on a half
real line. In particular, the domain is x 2 (C0;+1) when  < 0; and the domain is
x 2 ( 1; C0) when  > 0:
It is easy to verify that when C0 6= 0; the GOBI preferences have three-fund
money separation. The separating funds can be chosen as
f1 () = 
 ;
f2 () = 
2 ;
f3 () = 1;
with the corresponding investment weights given by
1 () = C1
 ;
2 () = C2
2 ;
3 () = C0:
When C0 = 0; this reduces to two-fund non-money separation.
As for the SAHARA class, (31) can be viewed as a quadratic equation of  :
Setting I () = x and  = u0 (x) ; we can rewrite (31) as
C2
 
u0 (x)
2
+ C1
 
u0 (x)
   (x  C0) = 0: (32)
Since u0 (x) > 0; we focus on positive solutions to (32). Using the properties of
quadratic equations, we can verify that (32) has a unique positive solution given by
u0 (x) =

G (x)  C1
2C2
 1

;
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where G (x) =
p
C21 + 4C2 (x  C0): Integrating u0 (x) then gives us the utility func-
tion
u (x) =
8>><>>:

(2+1)(2C2)
1+1= (G (x)  C1)1+1=

G (x) + +1C1

;  6=  12 ; 1 or 0
1
3

2
C2
1=2
(G (x)  C1)1=2 (G (x) + 2C1) ;  =  12
G (x) + C1 log (G (x)  C1) ;  =  1
:
5 Strict Concavity
We have so far assumed that all utility functions under consideration are strictly
concave, i.e., u00 < 0: This condition allows us to characterize the set of separating
preferences by (3) in terms of the inverse marginal utility. However, not all functions
satisfying (3) are strictly concave for all parameter values. In this section, we study
strict concavity of separating preferences and how it can be used to narrow down our
separating class.
Strict concavity is equivalent to I 0 ()  0 on the relevant range. Given the
functional form of our separating class (3), the zeros of I 0 () can only be isolated.
While the necessary and su¢ cient condition for strict concavity turns out to be
straightforward for one- and two-fund separation, it can become very complicated,
if not impossible, when higher-degree separation is taken into account. To see this,
consider as an example a K-fund separating preference whose inverse marginal utility
takes the form
I () =
KX
k=1
Ck
k ; (33)
with non-zero Ck. A su¢ cient condition for concavity is that Ckk < 0 for all k;
but this condition is not necessary. In (33), I () is like a polynomial (and is a
polynomial if all k are integer multiples of the same number). For a polynomial,
the utility function is concave if I 0 () is negative somewhere and all positive roots of
I 0 () have even order. Even nding the roots is a hard problem for which there is
no simple characterization. Other cases combining power terms with trigonometric
functions and/or logarithms are even harder. Therefore, it seems impossible to come
close to a complete characterization of concavity.
Despite the intrinsic challenge in providing a necessary and su¢ cient characteri-
zation, below we seek to identify some necessary conditions on the parameter values
that are needed to induce strict concavity. While these conditions are not su¢ cient,
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they allow us to narrow down the class of separating preferences by ruling out para-
meter values and forms of the inverse marginal utility that are not permitted.
The next proposition deals with the special case of fund separation, in which the
inverse marginal utility is given by the sum of power terms only.
Proposition 1 Consider a separating preference, whose inverse marginal utility is
given by
I () =
KX
k=1
Ck
k + C0; (34)
with non-zero C1; C2;    ; CK and non-zero 1; 2;    ; K such that 1 < 2 <    <
K : Then, strict concavity implies C11 < 0 and CKK < 0.
The following proposition further rules out forms of the inverse marginal utility
that violate strict concavity.
Proposition 2 If a separating utility function is strictly concave, then its inverse
marginal utility I cannot take the following forms.
1. I () = P (log ) ; where the polynomial function P () is of an even degree;
2. I () = P (log ) ; where  6= 0 and the polynomial function P () is of an odd
degree;
3. I () =
JX
k=1
kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) +
JX
k=1
kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) ; where
bk 6= 0 for all k:
While preferences with an inverse marginal utility function of the forms listed in
Proposition 2 violate strict concavity, more complex I () including these terms can
be concave. In fact, we have seen in Example 5 that the trigonometric terms can
be consistent with strict concavity when additional terms are present. We further
illustrate how to construct functional forms and choose parameter values to meet
strict concavity using the following examples.
Example 6 Consider a three-fund separating preference, whose inverse marginal
utility function is given by
I () = 

C1 + C2 log  + C3 (log )
2

;
26
with non-zero  and C3: Di¤erentiating I yields
I 0 () =  1

(C1 + C2) + (C2 + 2C3) log  + C3 (log )
2

:
Since  1 > 0, in order to have I 0 ()  0 we only need 8 > 0;
(C1 + C2) + (C2 + 2C3) log  + C3 (log )
2  0:
Notice that the left-hand side can be viewed as a quadratic function of log : As a
result, this inequality holds if and only if
C3 < 0;
and
(C2 + 2C3)
2   4C3 (C1 + C2)  0:
Therefore, any set of parameter values satisfying the above two conditions (e.g.,  =
 1; C1 = 3; C2 = 2; C3 = 1) would give rise to a strictly concave separating utility
function.
Example 7 Consider a three-fund separating preference, whose inverse marginal
utility function is given by
I () = 1 (C1 + C2 log ) + C3
2 ;
with non-zero 1; 2; C2; C3 and 1 6= 2: Di¤erentiating I yields
I 0 () = 1 1 ((1C1 + C2) + 1C2 log ) + C32
2 1
= 2 1

(1C1 + C2) 
1 2 + 1C2
1 2 log  + C32

:
Since 2 1 > 0; the sign of I 0 () depends on that of (1C1 + C2) 
1 2 +
1C2
1 2 log  + C32: We will show that (i) when 1 < 2; 1C1 + C2 < 0;
and 1C2 > 0 (e.g., 1 =  1; 2 = 1; C1 = 1; C2 =  1); or (ii) when 1 > 2;
1C1 + C2 < 0; and 1C2 < 0 (e.g., 1 = 1; 2 =  1; C1 =  1; C2 =  1), we can
always set C32 low enough such that I
0 () < 0 holds for all  > 0: We will show
part (i) in detail only. The analysis for part (ii) is parallel.
Under (i), since 1C1 + C2 < 0; we have (1C1 + C2) 
1 2 < 0 for all  > 0:
Since 1C2 > 0; we have 1C2
1 2 log  < 0 for all  < 1 and 1C2
1 2 log   0
for all   1: Given 1 < 2; we know
lim
!+1
1C2
1 2 log  = 0: (35)
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Since 1C2
1 2 log  is continuous, (35) implies that 1C2
1 2 log  must be bounded
above. Then, setting C32 equal to or lower than the negative value of this upper bound
is enough to guarantee I 0 () < 0 for all  > 0; giving rise to a strictly concave utility
function.
6 Machina Preferences
Our analyses so far have focused on von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, i.e., in-
vestors have expected utility. Machina (1982) shows that the von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences can actually be viewed as a special case of a larger class of preferences,
which we call Machina preferences. Assume that investorsutility is a function of
consumption distribution only and is smooth in the sense of Fréchet di¤erentiability.7
Machina proves that such utility functions are locally consistent with expected util-
ity. In this section, we ask whether our fund separation results derived for expected
utility can be extended to the Machina preferences.
Consider a Fréchet di¤erentiable utility function V () dened over the distribution
of consumption. Let x and x denote two random consumption portfolios with the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions given by F and F : Suppose that F
and F  lie very close to each other. Machina (1982) shows
V (F )  V (F ) 
Z
U (z;F ) (dF   dF ) = E [U (x;F )] E [U (x;F )] ;
or equivalently,
V (F )  V (F ) +E [U (x;F )] E [U (x;F )] ; (36)
where U (z;F ) is the local utility function over consumption level z evaluated at
distribution F: Assume that U (;F ) is strictly concave for all F: It can be learned
from (36) that the Machina preferences can be modeled locally as expected utility.
With Machina preferences, investors face the following utility maximization prob-
lem.
7Fréchet di¤erentiability is an innite-dimensional version of di¤erentiability. The idea is that
the utility function changes smoothly with the distribution of consumption. We are being informal
about the topology used to dene the Fréchet derivative if consumption is not bounded. In Machinas
original work (as in many derivations of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences), it is assumed that
consumption is bounded. To formalized what we are doing for unbounded consumptions, we would
have to specify the topology over distribution functions to dene the sense of approximation.
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Problem 2 Choose consumption x to
max
x
V (F )
subject to the budget constraint
E (x)  w0:
Suppose that x solves Problem 2. Then, it must maximize (36) with local utility
function U (;F ) evaluated at F : Fixing F ; both V (F ) and E [U (x;F )] are
constants. Therefore, x maximizes E [U (x;F )] : Given strict concavity of U (;F ) ;
x must be unique, and it also solves the following problem.
Problem 3 Choose consumption x to
max
x
E [U (x;F )]
subject to the budget constraint
E (x)  w0:
It seems that we are faced with a similar problem as in the case of von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences. Apparently, if all local utility functions U (;F ) at all F
satisfy fund separation with the same separation funds, then V () exhibits fund sepa-
ration globally. In fact, this condition is stronger than needed. The only thing we need
is for all optimal consumption portfolios corresponding to all possible initial wealth
levels to be spanned by the same set of separating funds. Since each optimal con-
sumption portfolio corresponds to a di¤erent local utility function, we only need fund
separation for each local utility function U (;F ) at the particular wealth level sup-
porting F as the optimal consumption portfolio. Formally, let UF  fU (;F ) ; 8Fg
denote the set of local utility functions U (;F ) evaluated at all possible F: Then,
we have the following su¢ cient but not necessary condition for fund separation for
Machina preferences.
Theorem 5 Consider a Machina utility function V () ; with the associated set of
local utility functions at all consumption distributions given by UF : If UF satises
mutual fund separation (characterized by Corollary 1), then V () satises mutual
fund separation.
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To illustrate fund separation for Machina preferences, we now provide two exam-
ples, one of which meets the su¢ cient condition of Theorem 5 and the other of which
does not. However, we will see that both examples satisfy two-fund separation. The
rst example is the mean-variance preferences, which have originally been shown to
satisfy two-fund money separation in Tobin (1958).
Example 8 Consider the mean-variance preferences
V (F ) = E (x)  a
2
E
h
(x E (x))2
i
= E (x)  a
2
h
E
 
x2
  (E (x))2i ;
with a > 0: This can equivalently be rewritten as
V (F ) =
Z +1
x= 1

x  a
2
x2

dF +
a
2
Z +1
x= 1
xdF
2
:
Di¤erentiating V with respect to F gives the local utility function
U (x;F ) =

x  a
2
x2

+ ax
Z +1
x= 1
xdF

=  a
2
x2 + [1 + aE (x)]x: (37)
Fixing any F; E (x) is a constant, and thus (37) is a quadratic function. This implies
that the local utility functions at all F are quadratic. We already know from Exam-
ple 2 that all quadratic utility funtions satisfy two-fund money separation with the
same separating funds. It is then immediate from Theorem 5 that the mean-variance
preferences exhibit two-fund money separation.
The mean-variance preferences assume that the only risk that investors are averse
to is the variance of consumptions. As a second example, we incorporate an additional
dimension of risk into the utility function, which is the downside risk dened as
E
h 
[x E (x)] 2i, where []  = min (0; ) : Downside risk is originally introduced
in Bawa and Lindenberg (1977). Kadan, Liu and Liu (2016) show that when the
risk measure is the sum of variance and downside risk, then the resulting mean-risk
preferences satisfy two-fund money separation.
Example 9 Consider the mean-risk preferences
V (F ) = E (x)  a
2
E
h
(x E (x))2
i
  b
2
E
h 
[x E (x)] 2i ; (38)
where risk has a variance component and a downside risk component with a; b > 0:
This can equivalently be rewritten as
V (F ) =
Z +1
x= 1

x  a
2
x2

dF +
a
2
Z +1
x= 1
xdF
2
  b
2
Z (F )
x= 1
[x   (F )]2 dF;
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where  (F ) =
R +1
x= 1 xdF is the expected consumption given distribution function F:
Di¤erentiating V with respect to F gives the local utility function
U (x;F ) =  a
2
x2 + [1 + aE (x)]x  b
2
[x   (F )]2 1x<(F ) + bx
Z (F )
x= 1
[x   (F )] dF;
(39)
where 1x<(F ) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if x <  (F ) and 0
otherwise. Apparently, (37) does not belong to the class of separating utility functions
characterized by (3). Hence, in this case the local utility function does not satisfy fund
separation.
While the su¢ cient condition in Theorem (5) fails, fund separation still holds in
this case. To see this, taking the rst order condition of (38) with respect to x subject
to the budget constraint yields
1  a [x  E (x)]  b [x  E (x)]  = : (40)
Solving for the optimal consumption gives
x = E (x) + max

1  
a
;
1  
a+ b

:
It can be veried that xing the distribution of ;  is a constant, whereas E (x)
depends on the initial wealth w0: Therefore, V (F ) satises two-fund money separation
with separating funds
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = max

1  
a
;
1  
a+ b

:
The corresponding investment weights are given by
1 (w0) = E (x
) ;
2 (w0) = 1:
7 Conclusion
This paper extends Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and studies the general preference-based
K-fund separation. We provide a complete characterization of separating preferences
in terms of the inverse marginal utility function and demonstrate our results using
various examples. We show how a subset of high-degree separating preferences can
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be constructed by adding low-degree separation in the inverse marginal utility. We
use one- and two-fund separation to illustrate cases that can be constucted this way
and cases that cannot.
We also study money separation, for which we can choose the riskless asset as one
of the separating funds. We show that money separation holds if and only if we can
choose a separating fund whose optimal investment amount is constant and does not
depend on the initial wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, the constant investment can be
assigned to either the riskless asset or a risky fund. We show that money separation is
closely related to shifts in the utility function. Starting with a non-money separating
preference, one can construct money separation by introducing a non-zero shift in
the utility function.
Our characterization provides us with a rich set of preferences satisfying fund sep-
aration and helps motivate new functional forms of utility functions that are tractable
and have interesting properties. In particular, we provide two classes of three-fund
separating preferences, SAHARA and GOBI, for which closed-form expressions of the
utility function can be derived. These preference can be very useful for theoretical
modeling and empirical tests in future research.
Appendix
As preparation for the formal proof of Theorem 1, we now review the concept of
Wronkian, which is rst introduced by Józef Hoene-Wronski (1812) and named by
Thomas Muir (1882).
Let  () = (1 () ; 2 () ;    ; K ()) denote a vector of functions with all
k () dened over a real interval   R with at least K   1 nite continuous
derivatives. Then the Wronskian of  at  is dened as
W [] () =

1 ()    K ()

(1)
1 ()    (1)K ()
...
. . .
...

(K 1)
1 ()    (K 1)K ()

:
It is apparent that if  () is linearly dependent on ; we have W [] () = 0 for
all  2 : Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse does not hold true generally.
That is, the identical vanishing of the Wronskian does not necessarily imply linear
dependence of  (). Nevertheless, Bôcher (1900) shows that this is indeed true when
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all k () are analytic functions.
Proposition 3 If all k () are analytic functions on ; then W [] () = 0 for all
 2  if and only if  () is linearly dependent on :
Proof of Theorem 1: (K-fund separation implies (3)) The sketch of the proof in the
text shows that when M0 () given by (10) is invertible at some , a utility function
exhibiting K-fund separation must satisfy (3). To prove that (3) is necessary, we only
need to show that (3) is obtained even when M0 () is not invertible at any .
Suppose M0 () is not invertible at any : Consider multiplying (2) by j for
j = 0; 1;    ;K; i.e.,
jI () =
KX
k=1
jk () fk () ;
where j = 0 corresponds to the baseline case explored in the sketch of the proof.
Taking derivatives with respect to  yields0BB@
@[jI()]
@
...
@K [jI()]
@K
1CCA = Mj ()
0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA ;
where
Mj () =
0BB@
@[j1()]
@   
@[jK()]
@
...
. . .
...
@K [j1()]
@K
   @
K [jK()]
@K
1CCA :
If Mj () is invertible at some  for some j, we can follow the same procedure
as in the sketch of the proof. Specically, we solve for fk () as functions of I ()
and its derivatives, and plug them back into (2). Rearranging terms and evaluating
at  = 1 (or at any positive value of  where (Mj ())
 1 exists) give us a di¤erential
equation of the form (13). Then, solving (13) for I () again leads to (3).
Now suppose Mj () is not invertible at any  for any j = 0; 1;    ;K; i.e.,
jMj ()j = 0 for all  and j. Notice that jMj ()j is the Wronskian of

@[j1()]
@ ;    ;
@[jK()]
@

:
Since k () are analytic functions, so are
@[jk()]
@ . By Proposition 3,

@[j1()]
@ ;    ;
@[jK()]
@

is linearly dependent for each j. In other words, for each j there exist tj1; t
j
2;    ; tjK
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not all equal to zero such that
KX
k=1
tjk
@

jk ()

@
= 0:
Integrating with respect to  and dividing by j yield
KX
k=1
tjkk () =
tj0
j
; (41)
for some constant tj0: This gives us K+ 1 equations corresponding to j = 0; 1;    ;K:
Since for each of these K + 1 equations, we have the same set of fk ()gKk=1 on the
left-hand side, there must exist p0; p1;    ; pK not all equal to zero such that
KX
j=0
pj
KX
k=1
tjkk () = 0:
By (41), this implies
KX
j=0
pj
tj0
j
= 0:
Since 1; 1 ;    ; 1K are linearly independent, their linear combination vanishes only if
all coe¢ cients are equal to zero, i.e., pjtj0 = 0 for all j: Since p
j are not all equal to
zero, there must be some j0 so that tj
0
0 = 0: We will show that this cannot happen.
If tj
0
0 = 0, by (41) we have
KX
k=1
tj
0
k k () = 0: (42)
Since tj
0
1 ; t
j0
2 ;    ; tj
0
K are not all equal to zero, take any k
0 2 f1; 2;    ;Kg such that
tj
0
k0 6= 0; and we can rewrite (42) as
k0 () =  
X
k 6=k0
tj
0
k
tj
0
k0
k () :
Plugging this into (2) produces
I () =
X
k 6=k0
k () fk () 
X
k 6=k0
tj
0
k
tj
0
k0
k () fk0 ()
=
X
k 6=k0
k ()
"
fk () 
tj
0
k
tj
0
k0
fk0 ()
#
:
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Thus, we have (no more than) (K   1)-fund separation, with the separating funds
being fk ()  t
j0
k
tj
0
k0
fk0 () for k 6= k0: This contradicts K-fund separation.
Hence, we must have tj0 6= 0 for all j = 0; 1;    ;K. This in turn implies that
there exists some j such that Mj () is invertible at some  > 0: Consequently (3)
can be obtained as the necessary condition for K-fund separation.
((3) implies K-fund separation) To establish su¢ ciency, we need to show that
any utility function satisfying (3) indeed exhibits K-fund separation. To this end,
the optimal consumption porfolio can be written as
I ()
=
JX
k=1
()k Pk;1 (log ()) cos (bk log ()) +
JX
k=1
()k Pk;2 (log ()) sin (bk log ())
=
JX
k=1
()k cos (bk log ())
dk;1X
j=0
Ck;1;j (log ())
j +
JX
k=1
()k sin (bk log ())
dk;2X
j=0
Ck;2;j (log ())
j
=
JX
k=1
()k

cos (bk log ) cos (bk log )
  sin (bk log ) sin (bk log )
 dk;1X
l=0
(log )l
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l
+
JX
k=1
()k

sin (bk log ) cos (bk log )
+ cos (bk log ) sin (bk log )
 dk;2X
l=0
(log )l
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l
=
X
fk:bk=0g
dkX
l=0
k;l () fk;l () +
X
fk:bk 6=0g
dkX
l=0


k;1;l
() f
k;1;l
() + 
k;2;l
() f
k;2;l
()

;
where fk;l () ; fk;1;l () ; fk;2;l () and k;l () ; k;1;l () ; k;2;l () are given by (4)
(6) and (7)(9). Since fk;l () ; fk;1;l () and fk;2;l () are linearly independent, and
k;l () ; k;1;l () ; k;2;l () are also linearly independent, K-fund separation holds
with K =
JX
k=1
(dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) :
Proof of Proposition 1: Di¤erentiating (34) yields
I 0 () =
KX
k=1
kCk
k 1: (43)
Strict concavity implies I 0 ()  0 for all  > 0.
To show 1C1 < 0; it is useful to rewrite (43) as
I 0 () = 1 1
KX
k=1
kCk
k 1 :
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Since 1 1 > 0, strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
KX
k=1
kCk
k 1  0:
Given 1 < 2 <    < K ; we have that for all k = 2; 3;    ;K;
lim
!0
k 1 = 0:
This implies
lim
!0
KX
k=1
kCk
k 1 = 1C1:
Hence, to ensure I 0 ()  0 when  approaches zero, we must have 1C1 < 0:
To show KCK < 0; it is useful to rewrite (43) as
I 0 () = K 1
KX
k=1
kCk
k K :
Since K 1 > 0, strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
KX
k=1
kCk
k K  0:
Given 1 < 2 <    < K ; we have that for all k = 1; 2;    ;K   1;
lim
!+1
k K = 0:
This implies
lim
!+1
KX
k=1
kCk
k K = KCK :
Hence, to ensure I 0 ()  0 when  approaches innity, we must have KCK < 0:
Proof of Proposition 2: Our goal is to show that in each case we can nd  > 0
such that I 0 () > 0:
Case 1: When P () is of degree 0, then I () is a constant, which clearly cannot
happen.
When P () is of an even degree d  2; we can rewrite I () as
I () =
dX
k=0
Ck (log )
k ;
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with Cd 6= 0. Di¤erentiating I yields
I 0 () =
dX
k=1
kCk
(log )k 1

=
(log )d 2

dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 :
Since d  2 is even, we have (log )d 2 > 0 for all  6= 1: Thus, the sign of I 0 ()
depends on that of
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 : It can be veried that
lim
!0
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 = +1;
when Cd < 0; and
lim
!+1
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 = +1;
when Cd > 0: This implies that we can always nd  small or large enough such that
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 > 0 and hence I 0 () > 0; violating concavity.
Case 2: When P () is of an odd degree d  1; we can rewrite I () as
I () =
dX
k=0
Ck
 (log )k ;
with  6= 0 and Cd 6= 0. Di¤erentiating I yields
I 0 () =  1
 
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k + Cd (log )
d
!
=  1 (log )d 1
 
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log 
!
:
Since d  1 is odd, we have  1 (log )d 1 > 0 for all  6= 1: Thus, the sign of
I 0 () depends on that of
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log : It can be
veried that
lim
!0
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log  = +1;
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when Cd < 0; and
lim
!+1
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log  = +1;
when Cd > 0: This implies that we can always nd  small or large enough such that
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log  > 0 and hence I 0 () > 0; violating
concavity.
Case 3: In this case, we can rewrite I () as
I () =
JX
k=1
dkX
j=0
[Ck;1;j cos (bk log ) + Ck;2;j sin (bk log )] 
k (log )j ;
where bk 6= 0; and at least one of Ck;1;dk and Ck;2;dk is non-zero for each k: Without
loss of generality, assume 1 < 2 <    < J : Di¤erentiating I yields
I 0 () =
JX
k=1
k 1
8>>><>>>:
dk 1X
j=0

(Ck;1;jk + Ck;2;jbk + Ck;1;j+1 (j + 1)) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;jbk   Ck;2;jk   Ck;2;j+1 (j + 1)) sin (bk log )

(log )j
+

(Ck;1;dkk + Ck;2;dkbk) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;dkbk   Ck;2;dkk) sin (bk log )

(log )dk
9>>>=>>>;
= J 1
JX
k=1
k J (log )dk
8>>><>>>:
dk 1X
j=0

(Ck;1;jk + Ck;2;jbk + Ck;1;j+1 (j + 1)) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;jbk   Ck;2;jk   Ck;2;j+1 (j + 1)) sin (bk log )

(log )j dk
+

(Ck;1;dkk + Ck;2;dkbk) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;dkbk   Ck;2;dkk) sin (bk log )

9>>>=>>>; :
It can be veried that
lim
!+1
I 0 () = lim
!+1
J 1 (log )dJ

(CJ;1;dJJ + CJ;2;dJ bJ) cos (bJ log )
  (CJ;1;dJ bJ   CJ;2;dJJ) sin (bJ log )

;
which does not converge but instead switches between positive and negative values
due to the cyclicality of the trigonometric terms. This implies that we can always
nd  such that I 0 () > 0; violating concavity.
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